by Chuon Malis (Phnom Penh Post, October 30-November 12, 1998)

Two days before Cambodia's elections, in Phnom Penh, I breakfasted with a friend working for a United Nations organization. A fluent Khmer speaker and historian, he and I agreed that the elections were not going to solve Cambodia's problems because the international community and, in particular, the European Union had conveyed the wrong signals to Hun Sen, thus spoiling the Cambodian people's desire for a new beginning.

It should be said, at the outset, that the international community has been unable to grasp the fact that by launching his bloody coup d'etat in July 1997, Hun Sen broke three of the key commitments enshrined in the Paris Agreements of 1991, endorsed by Hun Sen and by many, if not all, of the so-called "Friends of Cambodia", 1) the concept of peaceful resolution of conflicts; 2) the establishment of a true multiparty liberal democracy in Cambodia; and 3) respect for human rights.

The mild condemnation of Hun Sen's coup from countries such as Austr~ia, France, and Japan, which are major donors to Cambodia's rehabilitation and reconstruction, and the initial ambivalence of the United States to describe the coup as a "coup d'etat", were taken by the ruling party as some kind of international endorsement of the deposition of the democratically-elected First Prime Minister, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, leader of the Funcinpec party, thus diminishing the aim of the Paris Agreements which was to prevent a drift to dictatorship in Cambodia and a return to practices past, i.e: the killing fields.

The signatories to the Paris Agreements are committed to assume the responsibility and moral obligation of pointing out to the Cambodian authorities when these principles are not being respected, as it happened in July 1997.

The Paris Agreements commit both the Cambodians and foreign signatories to certain principles, including the building of institutions to establish an operating liberal democracv in Cambodia under the rule of law. The Agreements - as an instrument of international law - supersede national law and do not have a time limit, despite the impression conveyed by some diplomats in Phnom Penh that they are outdated and irrelevant.

For this vear's election in Cambodia the European Union assumed the role of paymaster bv funding in greater part the elections. According to EU sources in Brussels, in so doing the European Commission was using Cambodia to gain greater visibility in South East Asia and to do a trial run for similar involvement in future elections in Indonesia and ultimately perhaps even in Burma. The European Union had to be accepted to play such role. It could not, therefore, be too hard on the Cambodian People's Party of Hun Sen and attach strict conditions to elections truly representative of the will of the Cambodian people, thus endangering future electoral adventures in the region. The EU needed a success.

The EU is only represented in Phnom Penli by three fully-fledged resident diplomatic missions, those of France, the former colonial master of Cambodia, Germany and the United Kingdom. The French Ambassador, Gildas Le Lidec, made no secret of the fact that he supported Hun Sen and that he had nothing but contempt for the opposition. Le Lidec appeared to influence his less experienced German and British colleagues to adopt the same crude position which basically was that elections equal democracy, never mind that more than 100 opposition officials had been executed after Hun Sen's coup.

Behind a facade of European unity, there was in fact a substantial debate going on from the moment the EU decided to get involved in the Cambodian elections. Some of what the French dismiss as "the little countries of northern Europe", expressed reservations about the extrajudicial executions, violations of human rights and the state of impunity prevalent in Cambodia, while France and others pushed for a major non-conditional LU electoral involvement, which would not depend so much on the acceptance of democratic norms by the Hun Sen regime.

Until late February, France and its allies blocked any reference to the return of exiled politicians, and particularly Prince Ranariddh, as a major condition for EU electoral assistance to the Cambodian government. In particular, Le Lidec repeatedly said that the "elections should not be held hostage to return of Prince Ranariddh". Not until the "Friends of Cambodia", a group initiated by the US, had its first meeting in March did France agree to make the return of all politi cal leaders a condition for election support.

The Cambodian opposition, which suffered from internal bickering and a lack of vision and had almost disappeared from the political scene after the violence of July 1997, was strong in anti-Vietnamese rhetoric, but also argued that without equal access to the media and a truly independent National Election Commission, it would be difficult for it to participate in the elections. The latter was a legitimate point which was not seriously considered by the European Union.

The officer in charge of the Cambodian elections at the EU delegation in Bangkok, Mr. Aldo Dell'Ariccia, is said to have reassured Funcinpec and other opposition officials, on several occasions, that the EU was working to get the Cambodian opposition fair, if not equal, access to the electronic media in Cambodia, which was completely dominated by the Cambodian People's Party. It never happened.

Here, again, the involvement of Le Lidec was particularly negative. He was heard repeatedly arguing that the opposition had access to the Voice ofAmerica and Radio Free Asia and that "as both radios were proopposition" it should be enough to convey the Opposition's message to the people of Cambodia. Such an argument was fundamentally flawed and dishonest because none of the Opposition parties participating in the elections controlled the programs of either US-funded broadcasters.

In the end, the opposition was given five minutes each day on State television, which was never enough to convey a political message. Attempts by Funcinpec and other parties to buy television time from so-called "independent TV stations" were unsuccessful because the so-called "independent TV stations" were all CPP-aligned or CPP owned.

The United Nations Human Rights Office in Phnom Penh which monitored me dia appearances, in a report for the period 11-14 July 1998, found that the so-called "in-

dependent TV and radio stations" in Cambodia had featured CPP figures 446 times during the monitored period while the opposition parties had only been featured 25 times and often in a negative way.

The European Union said nothing about this state of affairs, despite the fact that its own internal documents, back in March this year, had listed "fair access to the media by all candidates" among its list of factors to assess whether the election would be free and fair.

Nor did the EU and others in the international community say anything when the

composition of the National Election Commission (NEC) was announced. Heavily aligned with the CPP, the NEC became an instrument of the CPP's quest to remain in power at all costs.

As expected the CPP was declared the winner of the elections with 41% of the vote. The opposition claimed that there had been intimidation of voters, widespread fraud and irregularities and refused to recognize the outcome of the elections unless several of its complaints were properly investigated by the NEC. The opposition's complaints were difficult to prove and most foreign observers hastily declared the elections "free and fair" without even waiting for the final results to be released by the NEC, which kept postponing making public the final results of the elections.

While there may not have been massive infimidation as claimed by the opposition but one can never be sure as far as the CPP is concerned if only 5% to 7% of the electorate felt it had no choice but to vote for the ruling party then the outcome would have been different. The mechanism of intimidation would have been more subtle as to go undetected by foreign observers who, in mst cases were not familiar with Cambodia's violent political history.

The refusal by the NEC and subsequently by the Constitutional Council to entertain the opposition's demand for a proper investigation of its complaints brought about large demonstrations which began as a demand for political accountability but soon transformed into demands for an end to Hun Sen's rule. This call came from Buddhist monks, students, workers and ordinary citizens. The demonstrators gained the support of the middle class, the backbone of Cambodia's economy.

Hun Sen initially said that the demonstrators could stay as long as they wanted and that he was not going to overreact against them.

Secretly, however, he was planning a crackdown which was going to put an end to the demonstrations as well as curtail the powers of moderate elements in the CPP, who were more amenable to making concessions to the opposition.

The hasty acceptance by the EU, ASEAN, Australia, Japan and 0thers in the international community of the outcome of the elections and their dismissal of the opposition complaints conveyed the wrong signals to Hun Sen that any crackdown he might undertake was not going to be condemned by them. His assessment was basically correct, however he was mistaken in assessing the mood of the population in Cambodia, at least in the capital.

In late August, Hun Sen ordered the Defense Minister, Tea Banh, to clamp down on the demonstrations. Tea Banh refused, arguing that he was a military man and not a policeman. Around the same time, Tea Banh is said to have told Chea Sim, the president of the CPP, that he was not sure that he could prevent army units from joining the demonstrators as they had not been paid for over three months and many soldiers had relatives or friends participating in the demonstrations.

Hun Sen then turned to his trusted aide, General Hok Lundy, Director of the National Police, who has no qualms with crushing dissent. The general is allegedly involved in the murder of the late Ho Sok, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Interior, within the premises of the Ministry. He is also loathed by the moderate elements of the CPP and enjoys Hun Sen's full confidence.

That week-end, King Norodom Sihanouk asked representatives from the CPP, Funcinpec, the Sam Rainsy Party, the NEC and the Constitutional Council to an informal discussion at his Siem Reap residence. The meeting started with the CPP representatives informing the King that the EU, Japan, Australia, ASEAN had all endorsed the elections as "free and fair".

The king is quoted, by palace sources, as having told the CPP representatives: "Yes, but have they been endorsed by our people? Please think of our people first". Despite this royal request, the CPP and NEC representatives refused to accept any of the opposition's complaints, which by then had been reduced to just two major ones. The meeting was a failure and by Sunday evening the King was threatening again to abdicate if the parties could not reach an acceptableagreement. The seriousness of the monarch's remarks was difficult to judge, as he has used similar threats in the past.

On Monday 7 September 1998, a grenade attack was launched against Hun Sen's residence in the center of Phnom Penh. The strongman had abandoned this house in exchange for his North korean-style fortress at Takhmau in kandal a long time ago. His father had stayed overnight in the largely empty house but was not present when the grenades were thrown against the house.

It was the excuse Hun Sen needed to clamp down on the demonstrations. A travel ban was placed on all opposition MPs and senior party officials. A warrant for the arrest of Sam Rainsy was issued and then withdrawn and demonstrators at "Democracy Square" opposite the National Assembly were told to disperse by midnight.

The violence that ensued, particularly against Buddhist monks shocked Cambodia but there was no haste from the international community to condemn it. The European Union, Japan and the United States kept silent. Observers believe that the international community is tired of Cambodia's neverending problems. If such is the case, those countries that signed the Paris Agreements on Cambodia should not have done so in the first place.

By endorsing the Paris Agreements they acquired a certain responsibility, together with Cambodia's leaders, to protect the rights of the Cambodian people. If the Cambodian leaders are unwilling to do so, and return to the practices of the past, the international community is compelled to actto protectthe people ot Cambodia, who continue to suffer through no fault of their own.

Thailand, to its credit, is the only country that has shown the courage in recent days to try to help the Cambodian people by making a number of suggestions to the CPPcontrolled Cambodian government. After giving certain assurances to the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister, particularly as far as the lifting of the travel ban for opposition parliamentarians is concerned, the government went back on the assurances and only allowed Prince Ranariddh to leave the country. Other MPs who attempted to leave Cambodia were refused permission to board planes by the police and immigration authorities in Phnom Penh.

Opposition leaders have told this writer that they cannot control the student movement nor can they prevent monks from demonstrating. This opens the door for the student movement to go underground or to join with remnants of the Khmer Rouge still scattered around Cambodia.

Under such conditions it is very difficult to see a prompt solution to the current Cambodian crisis and the formation of a new government. What remains clear is that as far as Cambodia is concerned, the signatories of the Paris Agreements have not discharged the responsibilities they acquired when they endorsed them in October1991.

If these countries do not feel ready to help to build the independent institutions Cambodia needs to promote democracy and respect for human rights, as enshrined in the Paris Agreements, they have no right to pressure Cambodia's opposition to enter a new "marriage of convenience" with Hun Sen which will end, as the previous one did, in further bloodshed and suffering for the Cambodian people.

(Chuon Malis, the author of this commentary, is a pseudonym of a long-time observer of Cambodian affairs. the author's name was withheld on request.)