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Kampuchea and Sino-Vietnamese Relations From: Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam By Chang Pao Min, (Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1985) Our
analysis in the preceding chapters shows that the conflict between China and
Vietnam over Kampuchea essentially reflects two divergent patterns of
relationship between Kampuchea and her two communist neighbours that have been
wrought by geography and history. The resulting differences in perception and
policy were reinforced by a profound sense of mistrust between Kampuchea and
Vietnam, on the one hand, and between Vietnam and China, on the other, after
1975, as a result of the changing political situation in Indochina. What had
been an old problem of security and survival for Kampuchea alone therefore
assumed a new magnitude out of proportion to its original significance. The
armed conflict in Kampuchea, in fact, soon became an index to, if not also a
function of, the Sino-Soviet rivalry. And by virtue of its political and
security ramifications, it also quickly came to entangle other countries in
Southeast Asia, both diplomatically and militarily. Precisely due to the growing
complexity of the Kampuchean issue and its long-term implications, the conflict
is no nearer to solution today than five years ago, and the shockwaves it has
generated continue to cause vibrations throughout the entire region. At
the centre of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict lies a fundamental clash between two
sets of outlooks and goals. Geographically and historically detached from
Kampuchea, China has traditionally viewed that country with a degree of apparent
indifference and a sense of impotence. With a distinct political and cultural
identity of its own, and having evolved as an independent nation after 1954,
Kampuchea from the Chinese point of view should at least be entitled to a status
equal to the other two Indochinese states. This basic policy of supporting
Kampuchea as a separate, independent entity, which has also been the cornerstone
of Beijing's Kampuchea policy, was cemented by a relatively long-standing
friendship developed over the last thirty years or so between Beijing and Phnom
Penh. And throughout the alliance, Beijing, by and large, played the role of a
benevolent bigger brother and never assumed an imposing posture in its dealings
with Kampuchea. In fact, China was both unable and reluctant to exert a measure
of influence on Kampuchea that was greater than Phnom Penh had actually
solicited. Clearly aware of the limits of its own power, Beijing from time to
time either displayed a conspicuous degree of aloofness from Kampuchea's often
openly pro-China leadership and policies, or revealed a measure of powerlessness
to render effective assistance to Kampuchea. And all along, Beijing was
apparently quite satisfied with a non-communist but neutral regime in Phnom
Penh. Indeed, in a region which has been generally hostile to Beijing, a
Kampuchea free from foreign domination, though not necessarily subordinate to
Beijing, already serves China's interests adequately. Hence China's consistent
and in fact enthusiastic vocal support for the independence, neutrality and
territorial integrity of Kampuchea, and her unfailing backing for the
intractable Prince Sihanouk as its leader even after 1975. Vietnam's perceptions of and goals in Kampuchea, however, have represented a sharp contrast to China's. If Kampuchea was until recent decades peripheral to China's vital interests, she has always been an immediate and paramount concern of Vietnam, not only because the two countries share common borders, but also because historically Kampuchea was the only potential source of threat to the security of Vietnam other than China. By virtue of her clearly superior power and status among the three Indochinese nations, with a historical relationship of suzerainty over Phnom Penh, and having repeatedly intervened in Kampuchean affairs since the fifteenth century, Vietnam has considered it a matter of course to enjoy a special status in her relationship with Kampuchea and to expect a Khmer regime more or less amenable to her wishes. This basically paternalistic attitude of Vietnam towards her smaller neighbour has been reinforced by Hanoi's undisputed leadership of and almost total domination in the prolonged struggle of the Indochinese communist movement, including the crucial years of 1970-1975. It has also been clearly shown in Hanoi's apparent lack of enthusiasm before 1967 to commit itself to the territorial integrity and political independence of Kampuchea, and in its recurrent and almost constant reference to the "militant solidarity and fraternal friendship" between Vietnam and Kampuchea since then. The demand for a Kampuchea at least closely allied with, if not also subordinate to, Vietnam became all the greater after 1975 precisely because of their far from amicable relationship during the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, in view of this recent history of enmity between the two nations, a completely independent Kampuchea from Hanoi's perspective is all but synonymous with a hostile neighbour and can only constitute a constant irritant and source of trouble. Therefore, whereas China is willing to tolerate a neutral but not necessarily pro-China Kampuchea, Vietnam cannot be satisfied with anything less than a special relationship with Kampuchea in order to ensure peace of mind.1 Vietnam's
insistence on a friendly Kampuchea, however, is certainly compatible with
China's desire for an independent and neutral Kampuchea, for Beijing, at least
prior to 1979, had neither the intention nor the capacity to turn Kampuchea into
a forward base against Vietnam. Nor did the Vietnamese quest for a special
relationship with Kampuchea necessarily entail an overt Vietnamese occupation
before the fall of 1978. Indeed, judging from the disparity in population and
power between Vietnam and Kampuchea, and the pervasive influence Vietnam had
developed within Kampuchea during the war years, it would not be difficult for
Hanoi to assume a degree of political control over Kampuchea similar to what it
had succeeded in Laos in due course. However, Kampuchea's intense distrust of
Vietnam and her perennial diplomatic manoeuvring to involve outside powers in
her defence strategy clearly upset whatever hopes or plans Hanoi might have had
for Kampuchea, and also planted the seeds of discord between China and Vietnam.
While Phnom Penh's China policy in the 1950s and 1960s was already based upon a
genuine fear of Vietnamese ambitions, the tripartite alliance established in
1970 authorizing a massive Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea made Phnom Penh all
the more anxious to secure Chinese assistance in restraining North Vietnamese
activities in Kampuchea. Although
China's decision to boost the image and status of Kampuchea vis-a-vis Vietnam up
to the early 1970s represented a continuation of her well-established policy of
supporting an independent Kampuchea, whatever influence she might have exerted
on Hanoi for the sake of Kampuchea could not but arouse Vietnamese suspicions of
Chinese intentions in Indochina. This is so particularly in view of Vietnam's
centuries-old resistance to Chinese influence in Indochina, as well as the
diametrically opposed perception Hanoi holds of Kampuchea. Whether
or not Beijing's increasingly close relationship with Phnom Penh actually
prompted Vietnam's early reassessment of her ties with China, the relations
between the three countries were clearly complicated by developments after 1973,
when new but conflicting security concerns were added to old suspicions in a
rapidly changing balance of power in Indochina. It so happened that such
security considerations were mutually in-compatible, as they entailed, from the
perspective of the two smaller nations, a greater measure of independence from
their respective bigger brothers, but, from the perspective of the two larger
nations, a closer relationship with their respective weaker neighbours. It was
such non-reciprocal expectations harboured by Vietnam towards Kampuchea and by
China towards Vietnam that led the two smaller nations, namely Kampuchea and
Vietnam, to solicit outside support in order to confront their bigger neighbours.
But the very act of involving outside powers in turn bred mistrust between
Kampuchea and Vietnam and between Vietnam and China. Thus, Hanoi's growing
inclination to exert greater influence over the Khmer Rouge quickly collided
head-on with the resurgence of Khmer nationalism, as shown in the onset of a
series of armed clashes during 1973-1975. Vietnam's new assertive stance on
China, and particularly her challenge to China's territorial claims, also
alerted Beijing to Hanoi's ambitions in the region. The result was a process of
realignment of forces in Indochina, with Vietnam moving closer to the Soviet
Union and China leaning more towards Kampuchea. The
end of the Vietnam War and the installation in Phnom Penh of a vehemently
nationalistic regime in April 1975 finally destroyed the supporting ground of
the precarious triangular alliance. Although Phnom Penh's anti-Vietnamese policy
was perhaps essential to reducing the pervasive Vietnamese presence in the
country, thereby keeping Hanoi at bay, it was simply unacceptable to Hanoi.
Coming immediately after a victory that could not have been won without
Vietnamese assistance, it could only be viewed by Hanoi as a clear manifestation
of sheer ingratitude that must not be forgiven. To the extent that the new Khmer
regime openly aspired to regain control of territories in the Mekong River Delta
area which had long been ceded to Vietnam, and was actually responsible for many
of the border incidents during 1975-1978, the Kampuchean regime was not merely
an irritant to Vietnam, but had actually become a real threat to her territorial
integrity and political stability. Moreover,
although Phnom Penh's intense hostility towards Vietnam was neither attributable
to Chinese instigation nor necessarily supported by Beijing, the longstanding
Chinese support for Kampuchea and Phnom Penh's awareness of it must have jacked
up the tenor of Kampuchea's anti-Vietnamese rhetoric and the intensity of her
anti-Vietnamese activities. Indeed,
from the Vietnamese point of view, Phnom Penh could not have dared to turn
against Vietnam so suddenly and violently without active Chinese encouragement. On
the other hand, although Hanoi's steady tilt towards Moscow after 1973 was
probably still more of a gesture of her determination to pursue an independent
foreign policy than specifically directed against China, it was already a bitter
pill for China to swallow, particularly in view of the long and intimate
relationship between the two countries cemented in blood over thirty years of
war in Indochina. Occurring after the tremendous sacrifices China had made in
both material and human
terms for the sake of Vietnam,2 and following almost immediately the end of war
in the region, it was nothing less than an outright betrayal of an old ally and
a blatant display of machiavellism. To the extent that Hanoi did solicit and
affirm a special relationship with Laos and at the same time assume an
increasingly adamant stance on its worsening territorial dispute with China, and
even initiate a long series of discriminatory measures against the one and a
half million ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, Hanoi's increasingly intimate ties with
Moscow did appear to be deliberately aimed at accomplishing its thinly veiled
regional ambitions. As such, Hanoi's anti-China stance and activities also
became a real threat to China. Although
the Soviets before 1978 probably did not make any firm or concrete commitment to
Vietnam vis-a-vis China any more than Vietnam had wanted to join the Soviet
bloc, the assurance of Soviet support apparently emboldened Hanoi in dealing
with both Kampuchea and China. Indeed, from the Chinese point of view, Hanoi
could not have discarded China as its trusted ally so rapidly without Soviet
instigation in addition to harbouring its own ulterior motives in the entire
region. It
was the chain reaction generated by mutual suspicions that steadily escalated
the war along the Vietnamese-Kampuchean border and finally pushed China and
Vietnam into open conflict in 1978. For Beijing, the Vietnamese expulsion of
more than 200 0OO ethnic Chinese into China in one single year, and the
resulting escalation of tension and violence along the still disputed
Sino-Vietnamese land border, clearly pointed out to an increasingly unscrupulous
neighbour whose unrestrained behaviour must be arrested. If Hanoi's policy
towards Kampuchea reflected only its ambitions in Indochina which, though
objectionable, were still understandable, its openly anti-China and anti-Chinese
activities could not be tolerated because they now directly threatened China's
security and stability. To the extent that these acts were committed with open
Soviet backing and Hanoi in the second half the second half of 1978 did somewhat
deliberately build up the tension along the Sino-Vietnamese land border, the
threat presented by Soviet-Vietnamese drive against China became an overwhelming
one. Hence Beijing's repeated protestations of Soviet-Vietnamese collusion
against China and Beijing’s massive aid and open support for Kampuchea, in
order to contain Vietnam However, the mere fact that China openly sided with
Phnom Penh when the Kampuchean-Vietnamese relations were rapidly deteriorating
was in turn sufficient to prove to Hanoi the degree of Chinese involvement in
the Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict and the extent to which Beijing wanted to
sabotage Hanoi’s long-term goals in Indochina. A Kampuchea hostile to Vietnam
was already unacceptable enough but still manageable. A Khmer regime openly
backed by Beijing in its anti-Vietnamese police became a serious challenge to
Hanoi's security and therefore, could only represent a sinister scheme of
Beijing to undermine Vietnam’s status and strength in Indochina. Hence
Vietnam's vehement accusation of China’s designs to divide and dominate
Indochina. If Hanoi had hitherto attempted only to weaken the Kampuchean regime
but not to overthrow it in an outright manner a decision was apparently made in
early 1978 to seize control of Kampuchea by all means, including massive
military actions if necessary, in order to put an end to Chinese interference. Nevertheless,
in the steady deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations, one continued to
detect a clear reluctance on the part of China to exacerbate her conflict with
Vietnam or to intervene directly in Kampuchea. This is presumably because both
the well-being of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and the war in Kampuchea
essentially represented situations largely beyond China's control. Thus, in
spite of the massive influx of Chinese refugees throughout 1978, China responded
only defensively and intermittently to the increasingly tense and violent
situation along her land border with Vietnam. There might well have been a
persisting hope that Hanoi would therefore be somehow placated. On the other
hand, while the escalation of Chinese military aid and the growing Chinese
presence in Kampuchea in the course of 1978 clearly would not have been possible
without the initiatives of an otherwise fanatically independent-minded regime in
Phnom Penh, the increasingly open and firm support China was rendering Kampuchea
during the year failed conspicuously to be matched by any concrete commitment to
the country's defence. In fact, the repeated hints China gave throughout the
second half of 1978 on the limited extent to which she would go to help
Kampuchea, as well as the pessimism she openly expressed about the regime's
future, should clearly indicate the degree of aloofness or rather powerlessness
on the part of China with respect to the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict. Beijing
apparently believed that a combination of open diplomatic commitment and
material assistance to Kampuchea should be sufficient to deter Vietnam at least
from any overt military action against Kampuchea, thereby preserving the
independent status of the latter. However, the Chinese clearly
underestimated Hanoi's determination to regain control over events in Kampuchea
and were also too optimistic in their calculations. Precisely because of the
apparent Chinese impotence or timidity, Vietnam somehow calculated that the
Kampuchean problem could be resolved once and for all at limited risks if
Vietnam gave it a final push. With a China tied down by large numbers of
refugees in her border areas, and with a massive Soviet presence in Vietnam,
Hanoi was also confident that China could not possibly intervene on a large
scale even if she wanted to. As Hanoi's repeated attempts at replacing the Khmer
regime with one more amenable to its wishes had all failed and there was no
prospect for an early victory in the border war, a swift military takeover of
the entire country became the most enticing, if not also the only alternative
for Hanoi to attain its objectives in Kampuchea. Whether
or not the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Alliance, signed in November 1978, had
been essentially a product of Vietnamese initiatives, its conclusion following
extensive Soviet military assistance throughout the year clearly removed
whatever constraints Vietnam might still have in dealing with Kampuchea.
In view of the far superior strength she possessed and the short distance
between Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese border, Vietnam also believed that the
military operation would be a very brief one, with only token resistance from
the Kampucheans and entailing minimal cost to herself. And once a fait accompli
had been achieved, China would have no choice but to accept the de facto
situation in Kampuchea. Hence the high posture which Vietnam assumed when
launching the invasion and the haste with which Hanoi formalized its special
ties with Kampuchea following the capture of Phnom Penh.
However, on both counts, the Vietnamese had clearly miscalculated. Not
only did the Khmer Rouge put up a stubborn resistance by adopting the very
guerrilla tactics Vietnam had used successfully against the United States,
thereby prolonging the military conflict, but China also intervened on a scale
beyond the imagination of the Vietnamese. In fact, Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea
constituted the turning point in Beijing's Vietnam policy which conspicuously
hardened after December 1978. Occurring after the drawn-out territorial dispute
and the mass exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, the Vietnamese adventure
represented the culmination of a long series of unfriendly acts against China,
and also supplied the ultimate rationale for Hanoi’s anti-China stance and
activities. With
200,000 Chinese refugees already in China, an open aggression against a declared
Chinese ally could, in the eyes of Beijing, only reflect Vietnam's insatiable
ambitions that had to be arrested at some point and by someone. And the
unbridled manner in which Vietnam entered and occupied Kampuchea only made the
humiliation to China all the more intolerable.
The result of Vietnam's action was also such that any measure less than
extraordinary could not have demonstrated effectively China's protest over
Hanoi's policy in general and its actions in Kampuchea in particular. Indeed, in
launching its own invasion of Vietnam, Beijing did not seek so much to fulfil
its pledges to Kampuchea as to penalize Vietnam for her wilfulness and
arrogance; and not so much to rescue Kampuchea from Vietnam's conquest, which
was after all probably beyond China's means, as to restore China's own face in a
hitherto losing conflict with Vietnam. It is only in the context of the above
that the bitter and strongly didactic tone of China's accusations makes some
sense to lay ears. However,
China's armed intervention was not merely a reaction to an accumulation of her
grievances against Vietnam and the situation in Kampuchea. It also served the
larger purpose of meeting the more serious Soviet challenge the Vietnamese
adventure was believed to have symbolized. And it was this greater menace that
actually pushed China over the brink of war. While China saw in Vietnam's
increasing hostility towards herself during 1977-1978 an unmistakable Soviet
hand, the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty which formalized the
Moscow-Hanoi alliance against Beijing clearly confirmed China's worst fears and
further shown her the degree of Soviet penetration in Indochina. From Beijing's
point of view, Hanoi certainly would not have committed an open act of
aggression against Kampuchea without Soviet sanction. Viewed in this light, the
Vietnamese invasion was not merely an aggression against a smaller neighbour,
but also a calculated and joint Soviet-Vietnamese undertaking to contain and
encircle China in Southeast Asia. As such, it posed a serious threat to China's
southern flank. Precisely because of the extent of Soviet involvement in the
Vietnam-Kampuchea .conflict and its implications for China, Beijing felt more
obligated to support Phnom Penh and also more justified to toughen its stance on
Hanoi. And in restraining Vietnamese hegemonism, China believed that she was not
only checking the regional ambitions of a smaller state, but also containing the
immediate threat of a superpower. Indeed, the degree of preparedness on China's
part to cope with the contingency of a full-scale war with the Soviet Union
during the 1979 border war could not have been merely for the purpose of
resurrecting the Pol Pot regime. But
the Chinese invasion did not render the conflict over Kampuchea more amenable to
settlement. Rather, it perpetuated Vietnam's military occupation by providing
her with both a pretext and a real need for remaining in Kampuchea. If the high
posture China had taken earlier on the territorial dispute and the refugee
crisis was at least expected and understandable — as they affected immediately
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, Beijing's military intervention
in support of Kampuchea, a country somewhat off the bounds of China's sphere of
influence, was from Hanoi's point of view clearly unwarranted and presumptuous.
That China should have launched a large-scale war against Vietnam, not as a
result of the territorial dispute, nor following the refugee crisis, but only
after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, could not but reflect China's own
hegemonistic designs against Vietnam in particular, and her ulterior motives in
the region in general. Indeed,
had it not been for China's military intervention and material support, the
Khmer Rouge probably would not have survived even the initial round of the
massive Vietnamese onslaught. By intruding into a region more or less dominated
by Vietnam and by obstructing the pursuit of what was viewed as legitimate
Vietnamese interests, China in the eyes of Hanoi clearly constituted the most
dangerous and immediate enemy of Vietnam and also the major source of
instability in the entire Indochina. Precisely because China has intervened on
such a large scale, Vietnam has found it all the more necessary and also
justified to persist in her policy of occupation. In doing so, Hanoi seeks not
only to ensure a Kampuchea subservient to Vietnam but also to put a permanent
end to Chinese interference in Indochinese affairs. The
conflict between China and Vietnam over perceptions of and goals in Kampuchea is
also reflected in the different strategies and postures they have adopted since
the 1979 war. Since Hanoi more or less views Kampuchea as essentially within its
sphere of influence and its military intervention as dictated by security
considerations, once in there, Vietnam considers the entire issue closed. Hence
Hanoi's moralistic approach towards the Kampuchean problem and its adamancy
first in insisting that there is no Kampuchean question and then in refusing to
participate in any international conference or forum to discuss Kampuchea. By
the same token, Hanoi has persistently urged other countries to abide by the
principle of non-aggression and non-interference with respect to Kampuchea.
Already in control of the country, Hanoi also sees no need to make any
concessions to anyone. Hence its repeated and open assertions of the
irreversible nature of the Kampuchean situation. Convinced that the Khmer Rouge
could not turn the tide militarily even with all the help it could get from
outside sources, and that politically time is on the Vietnamese side, Hanoi has
in fact unqualifiedly rejected any political settlement that falls short of full
recognition of the status quo. Even when Vietnam found it necessary to take the
initiative in selling the Heng Samrin regime to the international community
after 1980, the approach she adopted was still within a framework that was local
in nature, and all the peace offers she has since made have been aimed at
undermining the international pressure and keeping the entire issue out of reach
to China. While such a strategy is perhaps the only feasible one in order to
reduce the Kampuchean question to manageable proportions and to resolve it on
Hanoi's terms, it also reveals Vietnam's essentially paternalistic attitude
towards her Indochinese neighbours and her determination to keep Kampuchea
within her private domain. China,
on the other hand, has always seen Kampuchea as an independent nation and has
never recognized Vietnam’s inherent right to dominate Kampuchea. Therefore,
Beijing has adopted a legalistic approach towards the entire issue and has
viewed the Vietnamese intervention in and occupation of Kampuchea as a blatant
act of aggression not to be condoned. This explains why she has insisted on
treating it as a serious matter of international concern and on seeking an
international framework for the solution of the problem. Unable to provide
massive military assistance to the Khmer Rouge due to the geographical distance,
and aware of the vast disparity in military strength between the Khmer Rouge and
the Vietnamese occupation army, China also considers the mobilization and
maximization of international political pressure as essential to sustaining the
resistance movement and jacking up the cost of Vietnam'’ occupation. By
keeping the entire issue under international spotlight as much and as long as
possible. Beijing clearly expects to defeat Hanoi’s peace initiatives at
bilateral and regional levels, and therefore to prevent Vietnam from
legitimizing her conquest. Moreover, in order to ensure continuing support for
her Kampuchea policy, China has not only undertaken to promise military
assistance to all ASEAN countries, but also has gone out of her way to arm the
non-communist resistance groups and to pledge her support for a non-communist
regime after Vietnam’s withdrawal. These measures have been perhaps necessary
in buttressing the diplomatic position and fighting power of the resistance
forces and therefore increasing the chances of their eventual victory; they
certainly show China’s determination to obstruct Vietnam domination in
Kampuchea. But, the flexibility they reflect in China’s strategy also suggests
Beijing’s readiness to accept a Kampuchea almost in any colour, as long as it
is free of Vietnamese domination. However
Hanoi s dogged determination since 1979 to maintain its military presence in
Kampuchea and to persist in an uncompromising diplomatic stance, despite
repeated condemnations by the international and regional organization, is not
not merely a matter of perception of Kampuchea's relationship with Vietnam, but
also reflects a genuine concern about Chinese influence in Indochina. Precisely
because Vietnam considers Kampuchea as forming an indispensable part of an
indivisible security belt essential to her defence and well-being, China's
continuing intervention in the Kampuchean war is nothing less than a direct
threat to Vietnam herself. Hence Vietnam's repeated assertions of a Chinese
threat through Kampuchea and her insistence upon the removal of such a threat as
the pre-condition for reducing her presence in Kampuchea. Similarly, the firm
diplomatic and military backing China has been willing to provide Kampuchea
since the 1979 war cannot be adequately explained by her traditional image of
Kampuchea, nor is it merely a manifestation of any peculiar Chinese sense of
loyalty to a long-time ally. Precisely because China sees in Vietnam's
occupation of Kampuchea a more ominous Soviet threat to her own security, unless
and until Hanoi withdraws or is expelled from Kampuchea, Beijing's fears of a
united Soviet-Vietnamese drive to contain China from the south cannot really be
dispelled. Hence the repeated accusations made by Beijing of Soviet hegemonism
in Indochina and its insistence on a complete Vietnamese withdrawal from
Kampuchea as the pre-requisite for an acceptable political settlement of the
entire Kampuchean problem. Since
the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea is rooted in conflicting security
needs as well as divergent patterns of images and relationships, the prospect
for an early solution is virtually nil. On the fundamental strategical level,
China simply cannot tolerate the presence of a hostile power in Indochina, much
less so when it represents an act of betrayal by a former protege. In order to
ensure a friendly Indochina and a secure southern border, China has in the past
lent all-out and unswerving support to the Indochinese peoples during two
protracted wars in the region and under much more arduous conditions. There is therefore every reason
to believe that she will continue to pursue the same objective today whether the
new threat is posed by the Vietnamese or the Soviets. On the other hand, Vietnam
also cannot accept the continuing interference in Indochinese affairs by outside
powers, much less by a country which has geographically and historically posed a
threat to Vietnam. Nor can she allow a hostile regime in either of her two
weaker western neighbours. Indeed, from Hanoi's perspective the war in Kampuchea
represents the final round of a century old anti-colonial and anti-imperialist
struggle which Vietnam has to win in order to bring lasting peace and security
to herself And if Vietnam has fought successfully against the more powerful
French and Americans, she is certainly not likely to submit to the pressure of a
militarily weaker China. The incompatibility between these two sets of strategical
calculations are well illustrated by the very circularity of arguments and
demands made by the two countries: for Vietnam, the removal of Chinese threat
must precede any reduction of Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea, but for China
there can be relaxation of pressure on Vietnam only after the withdrawal of the
Vietnamese from Kampuchea. Unless and until one party retreats from its position
first, there is clearly no way of breaking the circle. Yet neither side can
afford or is prepared to make the first move as long as the war in Kampuchea
continues, since to do so is not only to concede defeat but also to actually run
the risk of allowing its fears to be translated into reality. For China to agree
now to stop pressurizing Vietnam is tantamount to accepting the legitimacy of a
Vietnam-dominated Kampuchea and acquiescing in Soviet advances in mainland
Southeast Asia, whereas for Vietnam to withdraw her troops completely from
Kampuchea now is to allow the resurgence of a hostile Kampuchea and to accept
China s pre-eminence in Indochina. As a matter of fact, quite ironically, the militant strategies and defiant postures adopted by Beijing and Hanoi on the issue of Kampuchea have not only reconfirmed but also reinforced heir mutual perceptions of threat from each other, which in turn have compelled both countries to persist in a hard-line policy. For Vietnam, China's intransigence has clearly underscored the need to Consolidate
the interdependence and indivisibility of the three Indochinese nations in
defence and other matters. For China, Vietnam's obstinacy has also exposed the
glaring vulnerability of her southern borders and therefore the need to minimize
it. Thus, if Vietnam before 1978 had desired only a special relationship with
Kampuchea and never envisaged a complete absorption of Kampuchea into Vietnam,
she is now clearly determined to proceed to complete the conquest of her weaker
neighbour. Yet having exhibited her aggressiveness in the eyes of China by this
policy, Vietnam is bound to invite continuing pressure from the north, thereby
generating a real threat from China. On the other hand, if China before 1979 had
only wanted to keep Kampuchea independent from Vietnam, she has no alternative
now but to promote an anti-Vietnamese regime in Phnom Penh. In doing so, China
also inevitably turns what has previously been merely an ungrateful neighbour
displaying pro-Soviet tendencies into a real enemy across her southern border.
And as long as China is involved in the Kampuchean war, the Soviet shadow is
likely loom large in the region, thereby actually complicating China's security
problems in the south. At
the more pragmatic — i.e., diplomatic and military — level, the two sides
are also unable to extricate themselves easily from the continuing conflict.
Having been on the defensive in its territorial and ethnic disputes with Hanoi,
Beijing could not retreat on the Kampuchean question without conceding total
defeat in its drawn-out conflict with Vietnam. Already committed to the cause of
the resistance movement with extensive investment, China also could not afford
to abandon the Khmer Rouge without seriously damaging her own image. This is so
particularly at a juncture of delicate balance of forces on the battlefield
which could well be upset in Hanoi's favour by any sign of vacillation on the
part of Beijing. Therefore, in spite of the little progress made in reversing
the military trends in Kampuchea, China's position on the entire issue has
remained adamant and consistent since 1979, and she has repeatedly assured Khmer
leaders of her unswerving commitment to the cause of resistance. Thus, on
November 5, 1982, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang told Sihanouk in Beijing: "China will as always
support the Kampuchean people in their struggle against Vietnamese aggression
until they win final victory".3 As
late as September 1983, Beijing declared: "As long as Vietnamese aggression
continues in Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people have not regained their
national rights, the Chinese
people will not cease supporting their just struggle against aggression until
final victory".4 In fact, since the formation of the coalition government
in June 1982, Beijing has stepped up its financial and military aids to the
resistance forces.5 As long as the
Kampucheans are willing to fight the Vietnamese, China is determined to stay in
the war. Although China does not expect
to achieve a miracle by turning the tide of the war in Kampuchea soon, she is at
least prepared to wear down Vietnam through a protracted guerrilla war. By
continuing to bleed the Vietnamese for as long as possible, presumably China
hopes to make the Vietnamese occupation militarily so costly as to render it
politically untenable, thereby ushering in a change either in Hanoi's basic
policy towards Kampuchea or in its leadership structure which would eventually
also bring about a policy reorientation. At the same time, by keeping the
anti-Vietnamese resistance movement credible and by expanding its political and
operational bases as much as possible, China also seeks as an immediate goal to
ensure that the military situation in Kampuchea will not become
so unfavourable as to lend any credence to the legitimacy of the Heng Samrin
regime. This is also why China has shown
such enthusiasm about a coalition government and such generosity in giving
military aid to all anti-Vietnamese forces as long as they pledge not to
sabotage the entire resistance effort. In fact, as a result of such a strategy,
Vietnam has had to increase steadily her troop strength in Kampuchea, from
100,000 in January 1979 to 200,000 in 1981, in addition to the massive build-up
along the Sino-Vietnamese land border. Indeed,
from the Chinese point of view, as long as fighting in Kampuchea is not over and
Vietnam's control over all Kampuchea remains a goal, not a reality, China is
still in the process of administering lessons to Vietnam. If
China could not afford to retreat from Kampuchea without serious repercussions
on both the fate of the Khmer Rouge and her own international standing, Vietnam
certainly sees no reason why she should surrender her gains which are all but
firmly secured. Having been in Kampuchea for more than five years, Vietnam
cannot withdraw now without admitting the illegality of her occupation all along
or allowing the entire edifice of the Heng Samrin regime to go bankrupt.
Commanding a clear military advantage in Kampuchea and fearing no direct Chinese
military involvement, Hanoi is also in no danger of being forced out of
Kampuchea in the near future. Indeed, without a clear victory in Kampuchea or an
all-out war against Vietnam, and short of a military conquest, China cannot
expect to bring Vietnam to her knees. Thus, in spite of the continuing stalemate
in the battlefield, Vietnam's basic position on the Kampuchean issue has also
not changed since her occupation began in January 1979. In fact, Le Duan in his
political report to the Fifth Congress of Vietnam's Communist Party in late
March of 1982 proclaimed: "The special Vietnam-Laos-Kampuchea relationship
is a law of development of the revolution in the three countries ... and a firm
guarantee for the cause of defending the independence and freedom and
successfully building socialism in each country on the Indochinese
peninsula".6 In late July, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach,
said in Bangkok: "The realities of the past thirty-five years when Vietnam
won wars against the French and the Americans proved that the Indochinese people
could not be subjugated".7 In November 1983, in response to the UN vote
condemning Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea for the fifth time Nguyen Co Thach
said: "Whether there is a voting or not, the stand of the three Indochinese
countries and their friends remain unchanged". And he added: "Just as
twenty years of voting in favour of Chiang Kai-shek failed to change the
situation in China ... the erroneous UN resolution in the past five years have
failed either to reverse the situation in Kampuchea or to prevent Kampuchea's
rebirth".8 As recently as March 1984, Nguyen Co Thach declared in a
television interview: "Experiences from the past five years have indicated
that...within the next five to ten years...the so-called Kampuchean question
will no longer exist".9
Vietnam
apparently believes that by staying as long as possible in Kampuchea, she is
sure to emerge victorious in her contest of will and power with China and to
turn eventually a fait accompli into a legitimate piece of territory. Hanoi's
determination to wipe out the resistance forces by all means is clearly shown in
its increasingly indiscriminate use of chemical weapons during 1981-82 against
both the civilians under the influence of the Khmer Rouge and the guerrillas
themselves. And this was done in spite of the growing international concern over
the matter.10 Since January 1982, Hanoi has also thrown additional troops into
the fighting in western Kampuchea and has launched sustained attacks on all the
guerrilla strongholds, including those of the non-communist Son
Sann forces.11 And in spite of the much publicized partial withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops in 1983 and 1984, the large-scale dry-season offensives that
invariably preceded such withdrawals have given every impression that Hanoi is
determined to achieve a breakthrough in the protracted war.12 But that is not
all. In order to expand and consolidate its grip on both Kampuchea and Laos,
Hanoi has since late 1981 somewhat stepped up its colonization campaign launched
in the spring of 1979.13 Although the precise scale of Vietnamese settlement
since the initial influx of 250,000 people in late 1979 cannot be ascertained
yet, the nature and momentum of such population migration is revealed at least
in part by the removal of the Heng Samrin regime's number two man, Pen Sovan,
from power in December 1981, allegedly due to his opposition to Vietnam's
colonization policy.14 Meanwhile, to speed up the integration of the three parts
of Indochina, Hanoi has steadily improved the communication and road systems
linking Kampuchea and Laos with Vietnam, provided considerable amounts of
economic aid to both Kampuchea and Laos, dispatched hundreds of specialists each
year to work in the two countries, and recruited thousands of students to study
in Vietnam. 15 In the light of all the above, the original French concept of an Indochina Federation has indeed already “passed into history” and lost its appeal to Hanoi as Vietnam has claimed, for after the drawn-out military conflict, Hanoi is apparently no longer satisfied nor feels secure with anything less than a thoroughly united entity in the form of a greater Vietnam. 16 As neither China nor
Vietnam is prepared to make any concessions, the outcome of the Sino-Vietnamese
conflict over Kampuchea depends to a large extent upon the ability of the
Kampuchean resistance forces to withstand Vietnam’s growing military pressure
and to continue to expand their base of popular support. It also depends upon
the successful cooperation of all anti-Vietnamese forces, which is crucial to
retaining at least the international diplomatic support the resistance movement
has been enjoying. So far the Khmer Rouge has repeatedly thwarted Vietnam’s
dry-season offensives, including the most recent and hitherto most intensive
onslaught by Vietnamese forces, thereby demonstrating its political resilience
and military credibility. It is also remarkable that the otherwise intense
mistrust between Sihanouk, Son Sann, and the Khmer Rouge has proven to be much
less than their common hatred of the Vietnamese, in spite of the recurrent signs
of strains between the three strange bedfellows.17 If the Khmer Rouge can keep up its military performance for another few years, and if the United front between the Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese forces can be sustained, the political fortune of the Kampuchean resistance movement could well witness a dramatic turn for the better. Conversely, It is also quite clear that failure to attain both of the above tow goals can seriously erode the legitimacy and international support of the Khmer Rouge, if not also jeopardizing the very survival of the entire resistance movement. Whatever the eventual outcome might be, the cost for Kampuchea as a nation and a people will certainly be tremendous. Indeed, it is both ironical and tragic that a nation which has been so eager to involve outside powers to ensure its security could well be in the very process of so doing, inviting its own ultimate demise. 18 However, whether or not Kanpuchea could in the end regain her independence and vitality, the relations between China and Vietnam will remain strained for a long time, since a final Vietnamese victory over the Khmer Rouge would be a humiliating defeat for China after so many years of commitment and investment, whereas an ultimate victory of the Khmer Rouge would deny Vietnam a valuable piece of territory essential to the formation of a Vietnam-dominated Indochina. ================================================== 1.
As one Vietnamese officials puts it: "We insist on a special
relationship, because there is not another example in history of such a
relationship where the two peoples shared each grain of rice, every bullet,
suffering and victory". FEER, April 21. 1978, p. 17. 2.
China provided Vietnam with a total of US$10 billion worth of aid during
the second Indochina War. ST, July 4, 1979, p. 4. Between 1964 and 1971, as many
as 300,000 Chinese troops went to Vietnam to man anti-aircraft guns and keep
roads and railways open and supply flowing. See BR, May 4, 1979, pp. 10-11; July
28, 1979, p. 27; November 30, 1979, p. 14. XHNA, July 30, November 27, 1979. ST,
July 31, 1979, p. 1. 3.
BR, November 29, 1982, p. 7. See also, XHNA, July 20, 1982.
According to Prince Sihanouk, Hu Yaobang, the Secretary-General of the
Chinese Communist Party, told him in January 4.
BR, September 10, 1983, Supplement, p. xvii. 5.
ST, June 24, 1982, p. 1; October 29, 1982, p. 9; November 22, 1982, p.
38; December 14, 1982, p. 1; December 29, 1983, p. 3. 6.
VNA, March 29, 1982. 7.
ST, July 24, 1982, p. 36. 8.
VNA, November 9, 1983. See also ST, October 28 1982 D 4 9.
VNA, March 27, 1984.
10.
PEER, January 15, 1982, pp. 22-23; ST, November 7, 1981 p 40; January 31, 1982,
p. 2; March 15, 1982. p. 3. 11.
FEER, January 8, 1982, pp. 14-15; February 26, 1982, pp. 14-15; March 5, 1982,
pp. 12-13. 12.
ST, January 19, 1983, p. 4; February 5, 1983, p. 1. FEER, February 17, 1983, p.
14; April 14, 1983, pp. 14-15; March 8, 1984, pp. 36-37; April 19, 1984, p. 14;
May 3, 1984, p. 20; May 10, 1984, p. 20. 13.
Voice of Free Asia (Bangkok), November 20, 1981; FEER, January 8, 1982, p. 13;
May 26, 1983, pp. 18-19. ST, August 13, 1982, p. 40; September 24, 1982, p. 40. 14.
FEER, January 8, 1982, p. 13. See also ST, November 5, 1979, p. 32; December 8,
1981, p. 18. According to sources in Bangkok, Hanoi in late 1983 again moved
large numbers of Kampucheans to the western border provinces in order to
facilitate Vietnamese settlement. The Khmer Rouge claim that since 1979, at
least 600,000 Vietnamese civilians have settled in Kampuchea, but Hanoi and
Phnom Penh put the figure at around 70,000. Renter Dispatch, Bangkok, October
27, 1983. See also ST, October 22, 1983, p. 3; Bangkok Post, September 30, 1983,
pp. 1, 3. 15.
FEER, October 6, 1983, p. 50 16.
The original French concept of an Indochina Federation was in fact a loosely
associated union of three to five nations led by France, each enjoying
substantial autonomy. The current state of affairs in Indochina has clearly
already passed that stage. See Ellen J. Hammer, The Struggle for Indochina:
1940-1955 (Stanford University Press, 1954) p. 112ff. 17.
FEER June 16, 1983, pp. 12-14; June 30, 1983, p. 15; January 5, 1984, pp. 14-15;
January 19, pp. 32-34; February 9, 1984, pp. 18-19; ST, November 18, 1983, p. 3 18. Prince Sihanouk in fact predicted the eventual demise of the Khmer resistance, FEER, June 16, 1983, p. 13
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